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Abstract
The European north-south divide has been an issue of a long-standing debate. We
employ a Global VAR model for 28 developed and developing countries to examine
the interaction between the global trade imbalances and their impact within the
euro-area framework. The aim is to assess the propagation mechanisms of real
shocks, focusing on the interconnections among the north euro area and the south
euro area. We incorporate theory-based long-run restrictions and examine the eﬀects
of (i) non-export real output shocks, (ii) expansionary shocks and (iii) real exchange
rate shocks. The results provide support for symmetric adjustment in the euro area;
an expansionary policy of the north euro area and increased competitiveness in the
south euro area can alleviate trade imbalances of the debtor euro area economies.
From the south euro area perspective, internal devaluation is the most beneﬁcial
policy. North euro area and U.S. origin shocks to domestic output exert a dominant
inﬂuence in the rest of the Europe and Asia while the strong linkage between trade
ﬂows within the euro area is conﬁrmed.
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And if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand.
 Mark 3:25 New Testament
1 Introduction
The global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession (accompanied by the col-
lapse of the global trade activity1) revived questions about the adopted economic policies
and their macroeconomic implications. With the debate still open, trade imbalances have
been suggested as a contributor to the global ﬁnancial crisis. An intuitive view is that
current account surpluses of the emerging economies supported deﬁcit countries which, in
turn, fueled the risk-taking behavior of the advanced economies, thereby sowing the seeds
of the international ﬁnancial crisis (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2009).2 In this context, it
is important to investigate the sources and the patterns of these disparities in the trade
relationships. In the European context, this theme is reﬂected in the disparities between
the north and the south euro area: the former with an export-oriented economy and the
latter depending more on domestic demand.3
Hassel (2014) explains that the organization of a country's political economy includes
the structure of corporate governance, industrial relations, ﬁnance, the labour market
education and training. The dynamic interaction of these sectors produces diﬀerent eco-
nomic systems. On the one hand, North Euro-Area (NEA) countries such as Germany,
Austria, Finland, Netherlands and Belgium have organized coordinated market economies
which are built on institutions and policies that promote the Export-Led-Growth (ELG)
1 The global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 has been followed by an unprecedented slowdown in world
trade. In fact, imports and exports in major economies dropped more than 20% from 2008Q2 to
2009Q2 (see https://voxeu.org/article/great-trade-collapse-what-caused-it-and-what-does-it-mean for
more details). Among the vast literature on the subject, Baldwin and Taglioni (2009) trace the causes
of the reduction in world trade to the decreased world demand while Ahn et al. (2011) point out the
contribution of ﬁnancial factors to the phenomenon.
2 Borio and Disyatat (2011), by looking at gross instead of net capital ﬂows and the silent trends in
international banking system, show that the link between the ﬁnancial crisis and current account
imbalances was rather weak.
3 The Financial Times on the 20th of August 2018 report that Germany is on course to have the
world's largest current account surplus for the third year in a row a situation likely to put more
international pressure on Berlin to rebalance its economy and Berlin has also argued that Germany's
ageing population prefers to save signiﬁcant amounts of income rather than spending it on imported
goods, see https://www.ft.com/content/07610a3a-a492-11e8-926a-7342fe5e173f.
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policies.4 Northern euro-zone economies tend to beneﬁt from a high production base of
exported goods which leads to increased savings and external lending. On the other,
South Euro-Area (SEA) economies like Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, rely more on
increased domestic consumption as a mechanism of growth promotion.5 The heteroge-
neous economic structures led to cumulative disparities of the euro area such as since the
inception of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, SEA current account
deﬁcits (on average 4.6 % of GDP) are mirrored to the NEA surpluses (on average 3.4 %
of GDP, see Figure 1).6
The existence of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has made it diﬃcult
for the two growth paradigms to co-exist without the formation of trade imbalances.
Exchange rate depreciation or devaluation is not a tool disposable to policymakers and
changes in the real exchange rate are slow (internal devaluation). There were two com-
plementary issues for the co-existent of two countervailing policies and the subsequent
trade imbalances in the euro area. First, over-optimism resulting in a strong growth in
domestic demand and appreciation of the real exchange rate driven by wage/price rigidi-
ties in the SEA countries. Second, ﬁnancial integration and expectation of convergence
within the euro area has provided the desired capital to fund the current account deﬁcits
in the SEA.7
There is a vivid discussion on the policy front that favours an expansionary policy
of the NEA through the channel of real imports to stimulate real exports and economic
recovery in the SEA and accelerate the current account adjustment. For example, the US
Treasury (2017) argues that Germany's huge current account surplus is harmful, creating
a deﬂationary bias for the euro area, as well as for the world economy. Furthermore,
4 The most prominent eﬀects of exports are attributed to increased productivity, beneﬁts from economies
of scale, greater utilization of resources and expanded aggregate demand. Furthermore, the export
sector of the economy can create positive externalities in the non-export sector of the economy (Feder,
1983). On the other hand, a neglected factor of the ELGH is the constructive aftereﬀect of imports
on growth, known as the import-led growth hypothesis (ILGH).
5 This divergence of the two growth models and the adjunct asymmetries that emerge has been pointed
as the main source of the lingering recovery in the euro-zone (Regan, 2017).
6 See also Figure A.1 in Appendix.
7 More formally, Chen et al. (2013) argue that the continued easy ﬁnancing before the crisis allowed
deﬁcit countries to continue appreciating the real exchange rate driven mainly by the nominal appre-
ciation of the euro.
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Krugman (2013) claimed that The narrowing of trade imbalances should have been
symmetric, with Germany's surpluses shrinking along with the debtors'deﬁcits. The
main argument was that a country that runs a trade surplus is diverting spending away
from their goods and services to its own, and thereby taking away jobs. What made
this possible in a monetary union was the devaluation of German real eﬀective exchange
rate (REER) through the decline of Unit Labor Cost (ULC). However, the IMF argues
that while the German REER was devalued by 10-20%, consumer spending has fallen to
54%, far lower than in the US and the UK.8 Therefore, in line with Krugman's argument,
if workers were paid more they could spend more on the domestic product which will
reduce export and increase imports. The counter-argument raised by Jaumotte and
Sodsriwiboon (2010) suggests a menu of policy options for the confrontation of European
trade imbalances such as ﬁscal policies that aim to increased government savings, internal
devaluation through a reduction of unit labour cost, increased productivity and tightening
ﬁnancial policies to curb credit and improve the quality of loans.
The aim of our study is to evaluate the view that an expansionary policy from NEA
accompanied by an improvement of competitiveness of SEA can accelerate current ac-
count adjustment in euro area. We do so by simulating numerous scenarios based on the
Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) as proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and
developed further by Pesaran and Shin (1998). We examine the regional trade interde-
pendencies between the NEA countries, the SEA countries, USA and the rest of the world
by implementing the Global VAR (GVAR) framework proposed by Pesaran et al. (2004)
and developed further by Dees et al. (2007b). This approach enables us to simultane-
ously assess the global nature of the macroeconomic factors and the interlinkages of the
diﬀerent regions under consideration.9, 10 Note that the multi-country dimension of the
8 The IMF showed that the German REER was devalued by 10-20 % while ULC fall by 16%. For more de-
tails see https://www.economist.com/brieﬁng/2017/07/08/the-good-and-bad-in-germanys-economic-
model-are-strongly-linked.
9 Applications of the GVAR methodology can be found in the areas of international ﬁnancial spillovers
(Galesi and Sgherri, 2013), macroeconomic modelling (Dees et al., 2007a; Pesaran and Smith, 2006)
and assessment of the global trade linkages and imbalances (Bussière et al., 2012; Greenwood-Nimmo
et al., 2012; Bettendorf and Leon-Ledesma, 2015; Bettendorf, 2017). Pesaran (2015) provide a detailed
review of the empirical GVAR applications.
10Alternatives to the GVAR modelling approach are the Factor Augmented VAR (FAVAR) or the Panel
VAR (PVAR) models. However, while in the former model is diﬃcult to identify the unobserved
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problem has been overlooked by the existing studies. For example, papers such as Chinn
and Prasad (2003) used panel regression where the countries included in their analysis
were treated as independent units, ignoring any dynamic or static interdependence.
Figure 1: Trade Imbalances in the Euro Area (Average values from 1999 - 2016)
(a) Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)(b) Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)
(c) Current Account Balance (% of GDP)
This study deviates from the existing literature in two ways. First, we augment the model
of Bussière et al. (2012) by considering the implications of the export-led growth model
and imposing long-run restrictions that correspond to the distinct structural features
of each country/region. The latter allows us to identify equilibrium relationships and
extract shocks that consolidate the theory.11 Second, we divide the euro area into two
factors, the latter approach in certain cases becomes operational by imposing restrictions on Dynamic,
Static Interdependences (DI) and on cross-sectional heterogeneity. For further details see Pesaran
(2015) and Canova and Ciccarelli (2013).
11Garratt et al. (2012) show that, in the context of macroeconometic modelling, there is a broad con-
sensus concerning the nature of long-run restrictions.
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diﬀerent regions and assess the linkages and the transmission of shocks between NEA and
SEA, within a global framework. There is a gap in the literature concerning the trade
imbalances between the northern and the southern euro area and this study attempts
to ﬁll it. Our focus is on the spillover eﬀects that shocks, emanated from northern and
southern euro area, have on domestic output, trade and competitiveness. We also consider
shocks to the US variables, as the largest economy in the world, as well as oil price.
First, we evaluate the impact of a positive output shock proxied by an increase of
non-export real output shock to the NEA on the SEA macroeconomic variables.12 The
aim is to investigate the view that a growth shock in NEA can be used as a tool to elim-
inate the trade imbalances between NEA and SEA. Note that within the context of an
open economy new-Keynesian framework similar to that of Lubik and Schorfheide (2007)
and Walsh (2010), the impact of a positive shock to foreign output on the domestic econ-
omy depends on the intertemporal rate of substitution, and the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods.13 Second, we investigate the eﬀects of a positive
shock to real imports both of the NEA and the SEA. We treat import shocks as a com-
plementary positive demand shock, which can not be captured by output shocks due to
the low values of the intertemporal rate and the elasticity of substitution eﬀects between
domestic and foreign goods. In a third scenario, we simulate the response of the global
economy to a real exchange rate depreciation of the SEA. In doing so, we can assess the
view that global imbalances in general and in the euro area speciﬁcally were associated
with the appreciation of the real exchange rate in the SEA. Note that the implications
of all three scenarios are consistent with the view that expansionary policy from NEA
accompanied by improvements of competitiveness in the SEA can accelerate current ac-
count imbalances in euro area. Next, we account for the eﬀects of foreign -from the euro
area perspective- positive output shocks originated from the US. Although the euro area
overall is not characterized by signiﬁcant imbalances, adjustments at the global level could
12We assume that output shock can be either demand or supply determined.
13Although an increase in foreign output is expected to have positive impact on domestic output this
might not be signiﬁcant for low values of a positive foreign output intertemporal rate of substitution,
and elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods (see Walsh, 2010 and Caglayan et al.,
2017).
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still have a signiﬁcant impact on Europe. For example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
show that a reduction of US deﬁcit and surpluses run by Asia and oil exported counties
would have important implication for the exchange rate and the level of production of
major economies (including Europe). Therefore, we estimate (fourth scenario) the eﬀects
of a positive real output shock and depreciation of the real US exchange rate. Finally, we
consider the impact of exogenous supply shocks proxied by a negative oil supply shock
(ﬁfth scenario).
The analysis is conducted using quarterly data from 1980 until the end of 2016 for a
multi-country framework that consists of 28 developed and developing economies. The
sample includes the period after the Great Trade Collapse (GTC) of 2008. The results of
the GVAR model support the argument that current account adjustment in the euro-zone
should be symmetric. Although positive demand shocks, in both regions, have positive
eﬀects on exports and investment, current accounts deteriorate or at best remain stable.
However, there is evidence that a devaluation of the real eﬀective exchange rate in the
SEA leads to an increase in exports without aﬀecting imports. Our results support the
argument that demand shocks in NEA accompanied by an improvement in the competi-
tiveness of SEA can help to eliminate trade imbalances within the euro-zone. With regard
to the foreign shocks (foreign from a euro-zone perspective), the dominant role of the US
economy in the global trade is conﬁrmed. We reiterate that the real demand in the US
is an important factor for the expansion of the global real exports. Finally, we assess the
global impact of the previous shocks with a particular focus on the spillovers eﬀects from
the NEA and the USA to the rest of the world.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the empirical literature on trade
models, imbalances and the theoretical background. Section 3 presents the GVAR model
and section 4 contains the model speciﬁcation and estimation. Section 5 discusses the
empirical results, while the last one concludes.
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2 Global Trade Imbalances: A Brief Discussion of the
Literature
The variations of external positions in the major economies, particularly after the 2000s,
have set the premises for global imbalances. Although the latter has a wider meaning, it
is common to associate excess current account deﬁcits/surpluses with the distortions in
the global ﬁnancial and macroeconomic system. In this context, the persistent current
account deﬁcits of the USA and other developed economies are accompanied with current
account surpluses in many emerging economies such as China, India and some East Asian
economies. The backdrop is similar in the case of the EMU; northern euro area countries
have seen a signiﬁcant melioration in their external trade position whereas southern euro
area countries support their current account deﬁcits through external borrowing. This
section attempts to highlight brieﬂy the determinants of such divergence in global trade.14
An abundance of factors is related to the rise in external imbalances: Bracke et al.
(2010) separate the determinants of global imbalances into structural and cyclical. The
former factors mainly focus on the impact of ﬁnancial market imperfections on the mag-
nitude and direction of capital ﬂows at a global level. Bracke et al. (2010) argue that
if the global imbalances are mainly driven by structural factors, a rapid unwinding is
rather unlikely to occur. Alternatively, cyclical or macroeconomic policy-induced factors
have ﬁred trade imbalances. In particular, if economic agents question the sustainability
of macroeconomic policies then overreaction might unfold global economic imbalances.
Therefore, one of the objectives of our analysis is to estimate the impact of cyclical factors
on trade imbalances.
Bracke et al. (2010) separate cyclical factors into two groups: i) those factors that have
a cyclical impact on private aggregate demand such as an increase of permanent income
and of ﬁnancial wealth and ii) those factors aﬀecting the demand of public sector. The
literature concerning the ﬁrst set of factors indicates that there is a positive but rather
weak correlation between private consumption and current account.15 An ample literature
14For a thorough discussion of the relevant literature on trade imbalances see Bracke et al. (2010).
15Note that an increase of private consumption can be driven by productivity shocks which increase
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of the factors aﬀecting public aggregate demand focus on explaining the twin deﬁcit
or twin divergence hypothesis.16 Most of the studies which investigate the impact of
ﬁscal policy on current account argue that there is a negative but moderate eﬀect of
ﬁscal deﬁcit on the trade balance. For example, Chinn and Prasad (2003), Gruber and
Kamin (2007) and Bussière et al. (2010) found a very low response of trade balance to
ﬁscal deﬁcit. However, Kim and Roubini (2008) provide signiﬁcant evidence of a positive
relationship between the ﬁscal deﬁcit and trade balance known as the twin divergence
hypothesis. In contrast to the prediction of most theoretical models, Kim and Roubini
(2008) show that a ﬁscal policy shock improves the current account and depreciate the
real exchange rate. They explain that a boost in government spending will increase the
real interest rate which in turn will reduce consumption and will lead to the depreciation
of the exchange rate. Note that an increase of the real interest rate will raise savings and
reduce investments. In doing so, an expansionary ﬁscal policy can improve the current
account.
Although the argument of Kim and Roubini (2008) can explain the twin divergence
hypothesis in the US, this might not be consistent with the empirical evidence for the
euro area.17 For example, Chen et al. (2013) show that the key adjustment mechanism
of the euro area debtor countries was not operating. In particular, while trade deﬁcits in
debtors required a depreciation of the real exchange rate, the euro nominal exchange rate
led to further real appreciation which, in turn, deteriorated export performance.18, 19 Fur-
permanent income and by a rise of ﬁnancial wealth as reﬂected by an increase of assets prices. Glick
and Rogoﬀ (1995) show that a 1% increase in productivity in the US decrease the current account by
0.15%. Furthermore, Bussière et al. (2010) have shown that a 10% increase in equity wealth in the US
could deteriorate the trade balance by 1%.
16The twin deﬁcit argument postulates that the ﬁscal deﬁcit is the main force that generates current
account deﬁcit.
17The majority of the literature has focused on the imbalances originating from the U.S. and the rela-
tionship between U.S. external position and Asian surpluses. Interestingly, some studies attempt to
assess the intra-eurozone imbalances and the structural gaps between core euro-zone economies and
the periphery.
18Chen et al. (2013) document that while the relative price movement within the euro-zone contributes
to the appreciation of the real exchange rate of the debtor countries, the lion share of the appreciation
between 2000 and 2009 was accounted for by the nominal appreciation of the euro vis-a-vis other
countries.
19Chen et al. (2013) also show that the external deﬁcit of the euro-zone debtor countries was ﬁnanced
by capital ﬂows from the core euro area countries such as Germany and France leading to weaker real
exchange rate adjustment mechanisms.
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thermore, Chen et al. (2013) point that euro area current account imbalances depict the
asymmetric response of the member countries to foreign (from a euro area perspective)
trade shocks, possibly due to variations in foreign income export elasticities. Alterna-
tively, Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) underline the role of decreased private savings
in the SEA countries as a driver for the trade imbalance in the euro area. Utilizing current
account regressions, they link declined current accounts with the ﬁnancial liberalization
of the EMU that depressed saving rates and funded less productive sectors.20 Jaumotte
and Sodsriwiboon (2010) suggest a menu of policy options for the confrontation of Euro-
pean trade imbalances such as ﬁscal policies that aim to increased government savings,
internal devaluation through a reduction of unit labor cost, increase productivity and
tightening ﬁnancial policies to curb credit and improve the quality of loans.21
3 Econometric Methodology
The global ﬁnancial crisis has illustrated that the linkages among economies have be-
come increasingly complex. It is imperative, for the methodology employed, to account
for the global interactions of macroeconomic factors. A fundamental problem of global
macroeconomic models is the curse of dimensionality, which arises when the number of
variables is large compared to the time dimension. To overcome the curse of dimension-
ality Pesaran et al. (2004) (PSW hereafter) developed a global VAR for the analysis of
global interdependencies and the propagation of shocks across the world economy. The
GVAR methodology consists of two steps. In the ﬁrst, country-speciﬁc VARX* mod-
els are estimated, which account for the outside economy via the cross-section average
of foreign variables known as the star variables.22 In the second step, the estimated
country-speciﬁc VARX*s are stacked in a GVAR.
20Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) claim that the introduction of the euro lowered current accounts
in both NEA and SEA through the maintenance of high levels of investment.
21The appealing properties of a decreased real exchange rate in the debtor countries of the euro-zone
are also highlighted by Belke and Dreger (2013).
22 Dees et al. (2007b) (DdPS hereafter) motivate the GVAR approach as an approximation to the global
factor model. DdPS use the cross-sectional average of the foreign variables to reﬂect the unobserved
common factors of the global economy. Chudik and Pesaran (2011) motivate the GVAR approach as
an approximation to a large system where all variables are determined endogenously. Note that the
foreign variables were assumed to be weakly exogenous.
9
The North-South Divide, the Euro and the World
There are alternative approaches for modelling a large number of variables such as
FAVAR, PVAR and large Bayesian VAR. Factor models have been used as data shrinkage
procedures, which summarize the information of a large number of variables in a small
number of selected factors. However, the economic interpretation of the extracted factors
is a rather diﬃcult task.23 Alternatively, PVARs or large-scale Bayesian VARs solve the
problem of dimensionality by restricting the parameter space. In particular, the PVAR
imposes restrictions on the dynamic and static interdependence and on the cross-sectional
homogeneity.24 Although the GVAR model provides a coherent framework to model the
global economy and to assess both global shocks and shocks that emanate from a speciﬁc
country, to the best of our knowledge there are only three papers; Greenwood-Nimmo
et al. (2012), Bussière et al. (2012) (BCS hereafter) and Bettendorf (2017) that apply
GVAR to the issue of international trade and global imbalances.25
BCS employ a GVAR approach as proposed by Chudik and Pesaran (2011) to a set of
four domestic variables (exports, imports, GDP and real exchange rate) and one global
variable (oil price) for 21 economies. Results from GIRFs indicate that a positive shock
in the output of US leads to increased output and exports in almost all the countries
pointing out the signiﬁcance of the US economy in the world. Similarly, a positive shock
in the German output aﬀects positively mainly the European countries output due to the
importance of the German economy in the European business cycles. Bettendorf (2017)
investigates the impact of a German wage moderation shock on the European current
account imbalances.26 Moreover, show that although the German current account was
signiﬁcantly aﬀected by wage moderation shocks, its contribution to European current
23Unlike the FAVAR, the GVAR models allow for country-speciﬁc dynamic explicitly and account for
cointegration relationships.
24Canova and Ciccarelli (2013) show that a PVAR shrinks the parameter space by assuming that the
unknown parameters can be decomposed into a component that is common across cross-sectional units,
across all variables, a variable speciﬁc component, lag speciﬁc component and idiosyncratic eﬀects.
25The GVAR has been widely applied in many ﬁelds such as global ﬁnancial spillovers (PSW; Galesi
and Sgherri, 2013; Chudik and Fratzscher, 2011; Favero, 2013), international transmission of macroe-
conomic shocks and global business cycles (DdPS; Eickmeier and Ng, 2011; Garratt et al., 2013),
global inﬂation linkages (Galesi and Lombardi, 2009), forecasting of economic and ﬁnancial variables
(Pesaran et al., 2009) and common ﬁscal policies assessment in the EU (Hebous and Zimmermann,
2013; Ricci-Risquete and Ramajo-Hernández, 2015).
26 Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2012) beneﬁt from a larger set of data with 33 countries (26 regions) and
conduct several probabilistic forecasting exercises with a particular focus on the USA, China, the euro
area and Japan based on the model of DdPS.
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account imbalances was negligible. Therefore, Bettendorf (2017) concludes that German
labor market reforms cannot be the lone driver of European imbalances. Bilateral current
account imbalances have received more attention. Obviously, this result can incite the
discussion regarding the determinants of the observed trade imbalances between northern
and southern euro area with an international perspective. Hence, the global dynamics of
international trade relations and patterns can be fully utilized under the GVAR frame-
work.
3.1 The Global VAR Modelling
We consider a world that consists of N countries, indexed by i = 0, . . . , N − 1 where
i = 0 stands for the numeraire country (USA in our case). We assume that xit is a ki × 1
vector of country-speciﬁc endogenous variables and x∗
it
=
∑N
j=1 wi j x jt is a k
∗
i
× 1 vector
of the country-speciﬁc foreign variables, where wi j ≥ 0 are the set of trade weights with∑N
j=1 wi j = 1 and wii = 0. Note that wi j ≥ 0 represents the share of country j to the total
share of country i. The ﬁrst step in the GVAR methodology is to specify and estimate
the individual country-speciﬁc VARX*(pi, qi) models. We consider the case of VARX*(2,
1):
xit = ai0 + ai1t +Φi1xi,t−1 +Φi2xi,t−2 + Λi0x
∗
it + Λi1x
∗
i,t−1 + δi0dt + δi1dt−1 + uit (1)
where Φil for l = 1, 2 are ki × ki matrix of lagged coeﬃcients and Λi0 and Λi1 are ki ×
k∗
i
matrices of the corresponding foreign variables coeﬃcients.27 Also, dit is a md × 1
vector of global variables (such as oil price), ai0 is a ki × 1 vector of intercept terms
and ai1 is a ki × 1 vector of trend coeﬃcients. The vector of country-speciﬁc shock is
given by uit , where E(uitu js) = Ωij for t = s and E(uitu js) = 0 for t , s. Equation
(1) indicates that spillover eﬀects across countries can occur through three distinct but
interrelated channels: i) direct and lagged impact of x∗
it
on xit ; ii) dependence of country-
speciﬁc variables on common global exogenous variables (i.e. dit); and iii) non-zero
27Any further generalization to diﬀerent lags of domestic and foreign variables is straightforward.
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contemporaneous dependence of shocks via cross covariances Ωi j . Equation (1) can be
written as:
Ai zit = Bi1zi,t−1 + Bi2zi,t−2 + φit + uit (2)
where zi,t−1 = (x
′
i,t−1
, x∗
′
i,t−1
)
′
is a ki + k∗i dimensional vector, Ai = (I ki,−Λi0), Bi1 =
(Φi1,Λi1), Bi2 = (Φi2, 0) and φit = ai0 + ai1t + δi0dt + δi1dt−1.
The second step of the GVARmodel consist of staking theN country-speciﬁc VARX*(2,1)
models in one global VAR. In particular, collecting all the country-speciﬁc variables in
a k × 1 vector x˜ = (x
′
0t
, x
′
1t
, . . . , x
′
Nt
)
′
where k =
∑N
i=0 ki and using the (ki + k
∗
i
) × k link
matrices W i = [E′i, W˜ i], where Ei and W˜ i are k × ki and k × k
∗
i
dimensional selection
matrices respectively, we can write:
zit =
©­­«
xit
x∗
it
ª®®¬ = W i x˜t i = 0, . . . , N − 1 (3)
Substituting (3) into (2) yields:
AiW i x˜t = Bi1W i x˜t−1 + Bi2W i x˜t−2 + φit + +uit (4)
And by stacking each country-speciﬁc model in (4), we obtain the GVAR(2) model for
all the endogenous variables xt :
Hx˜t = F1 x˜t−1 + F2 x˜t−2 + φt + ut (5)
where H =
©­­­­­­­­«
A0W 0
A1W 1
...
AN−1W N−1
ª®®®®®®®®¬
, F1 =
©­­­­­­­­«
B01W 0
B11W 1
...
B(N−1)1W N−1
ª®®®®®®®®¬
, F2 =
©­­­­­­­­«
B02W 0
B12W 1
...
B(N−1)2W N−1
ª®®®®®®®®¬
, φt =
©­­­­­­­­«
φ0t
φ1t
...
φ(N−1)t
ª®®®®®®®®¬
and
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ut =
©­­­­­­­­«
u0t
u1t
...
u(N−1)t
ª®®®®®®®®¬
.
The reduced form of the GVAR(2) solution is obtained from:
x˜t = G1 x˜t−1 + G2 x˜t−2 + φ˜t + u˜t (6)
where G1 = H−1F1, G2 = H−1F2, φ˜t = H
−1φt and u˜t = H
−1ut . The GVAR model (6) is
solved recursively and used for the impulse response function analysis.
4 Data and Model Speciﬁcation
The employed dataset is of vital importance for this study. We do not consider countries
with data that are unavailable, unreliable or have a short time span. Our analysis consists
of quarterly data from 1980Q1 to 2016Q4 (148 observations in total) for 28 developed
and developing countries. In line with our objectives and theoretical framework, we
group the euro area countries into two sub-regions: NEA (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
Germany and the Netherlands) and SEA, (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). There
are a number of reasons to justify this. For example, the SEA has experienced higher
inﬂation, unemployment rates and government debt than the NEA. Another distinction
emerges from the current account imbalances between the NEA and SEA economies. We
choose not to include France and Ireland to any of the above regions as there is no clear
evidence for their insertion in one or another sub-region (they are included in the GVAR
model as separate entities though). All the remaining countries of the paper are treated
as independent entities. Thus, the constructed GVAR model consists of 21 entities (see
Table 1). These countries/regions cover on average 80% of the nominal world GDP over
the last ﬁve years. In comparison to the work of BCS, we broaden the sample of countries
included in the analysis (28 countries relative to 21 in BCS) and extend the sample with
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9 additional years. Furthermore, we increase the number of endogenous variables in the
GVAR model to ﬁve as we extend the set of exports, imports, output and real exchange
rate in the BCS analysis with the gross capital formation.
In particular, we construct a country-speciﬁc VARX* including 5 endogenous vari-
ables; domestic output (nyit), gross capital formation (gc fit), exports (exit), imports
(imit) and the real eﬀective exchange rate (reerit). Domestic output for the country i
is proxied by the diﬀerence between the real GDP and the real exports of goods and
services at time t.28 In addition to the 5 endogenous variables, we consider three foreign
variables (ny∗
it
, gc f ∗
it
, reer∗
it
). We exclude foreign variables of exports ex∗
it
and imports im∗
it
from the individual models due to the possibility of collinearity.29,30 The estimation and
dynamic analysis of the GVAR model is conducted using the GVAR toolbox 2.0 created
by Smith and Galesi (2014). We also incorporate the oil price as an exogenous global
variable (poilt). Therefore, the vectors of country speciﬁc domestic and foreign variables
are:31
xit = (nyit, gc fit, exit, imit, reerit)
′
for i = 1, . . . , N − 1 and
x∗
it
= (ny∗
it
, gc f ∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poilt)
′
for i = 1, . . . , N − 1
For the case of the USA (where i = 0) we follow Dees et al. (2007b) and treat the oil
price as an endogenous variable. Thus, the USA vectors of domestic and foreign variables
are:
x0t = (ny0t, gc f0t, ex0t, im0t, reer0t, poilt)
′
and
x∗
0t
= (ny∗
0t
, gc f ∗
0t
, reer∗
0t
)
To construct the foreign variables, we used trade weights that correspond, for each country
in the sample, to the trade shares of foreign countries in total export and imports over the
28All variables are referring to natural logarithms of real values and are seasonally adjusted.
29As Greenwood-Nimmo et al. (2012) point out, the assumption of weak-exogeneity between the foreign
trade variables and the domestic endogenous trade variables can not be sustained in a model that
takes into account the majority of the world trade as exit = im
∗
it
and vice-versa.
30For a detailed description of the data sources see Table A.1 in the Appendix.
31Due to data unavailability, we exclude from the VARX* model the real gross capital formation of
China as an endogenous variable. Therefore, the corresponding domestic variables vector for China is:
xit = (nyit, exit, imit, reerit )
′
.
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period 2012-2016.32 The regional variables of the NEA and SEA were constructed using
a weighted average scheme for each individual country. Following the relevant strand of
the literature, we employ average PPP-GDP weights over the period 2012-2016.
4.1 Long Run Relationships in the GVAR analysis
We adopt the approach of Garratt et al. (2012) and allow the short-run dynamics to be
estimated ﬂexibly within a VARX framework while we impose theory-consistent long-run
restrictions. Garratt et al. (2012) argue that economic theory is typically more informa-
tive about the long-run relationships than it is on the short-run dynamic.33 Garratt et al.
(2012) also argue that there is a degree of consensus regarding the long-run properties
of macroeconomic models whether they have been developed within the Simultaneous
Equation Models (SEMs), structural VAR or the DSGE approaches. Alternatively, there
is less agreement about how to model short-run dynamic adjustment. Following, the
GVAR literature, we estimate a VECMX* representation of the reference equation:
∆xit = ci0 − αiβ
′
i[zi,t−1 − µidi,t−1 − γi(t − 1)]
+ Γi∆xi,t−1 + Λi∆x
∗
it + δ
∗
i0∆dt + δ
∗
i1∆dt−1 + uit
(7)
where αi is a ki×ri matrix of rank ri and βi = (β
′
ix, β
′
ix∗, β
′
id)
′
is a (ki+k∗i +md)×ri matrix of
rank ri. The country-speciﬁc VECMX* in (7) allows for cointegration between domestic
and foreign variables. The identiﬁcation of the long-run equilibrium is not trivial because
there are many linear combinations of the cointegrating vectors that are observationally
equivalent and link the level of domestic output (GDP net of exports) with the levels of
capital, exports and imports of goods and services in an economy.34
32 Although the choice of weights for the construction of foreign variables is a subject of discussion,
Forbes and Chinn (2004) argue that bilateral trade is one of the most important determinants of
the linkages among countries. Moreover, PSW point out that trade weights show the extent that one
country/region is linked to another. We utilize a 21×21 trade weights link matrix using bilateral trade,
based on data from the Direction of Trade Statistics. Table 2 reports the trade weight matrix for the
countries/regions of major interest.
33This is because economic theory is frequently silent concerning the sequence of economic decisions, the
structure of information sets across agents and the nature of rigidities arose from transaction cost.
34Note that we can choose any non-singular r × r matrix Q such as αiβ
′
i = αiQ
−′Qβ′ = α∗
i
β∗
′
i . The new
coeﬃcient matrices α∗
i
and β∗
′
i are observationally equivalent to αiβ
′
i respectively.
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Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function that depends on imported goods and
exports, we can show that domestic output net of export is given by:
nyit = cit + c1igc fit + c2iexit + c3iimit (8)
We consider equation (8) as a long run representation of the ELGH theory. This suggests
that the volumes of domestic output, capital, exports and imports would cointegrate. In
addition, if there is no evidence that equation (8) holds as an entity, we consider the
enhanced trade equations suggested by BCS. The enhanced trade equations allow for
cointegration among exports and imports along with the traditional demand and price
variables. Finally, we test for cointegration among the volumes of exports and imports
for each country. The following table summarizes the long-run relationships considered
in our GVAR analysis.35
The Long-Run Relationships in the GVAR Analysis
Export-Led-Growth Hypothesis nyit − c1i kit − c2iexit − c3iimit ∼ I(0)
Enhanced
Trade Equations
Exports
Equation
exit − a1iimit − a2iny
∗
it
− a3ireerit ∼ I(0)
Imports
Equation
imit − β1iexit − β2inyit − β3ireerit ∼ I(0)
Stationarity of the Trade Balance exit − imit ∼ I(0)
4.1.1 Modelling Strategy
It is worth noting that possible misspeciﬁcation of the cointegrating vectors will have
implications for the stability of GVAR, the behaviour of impulse response functions and
35In order to estimate the corresponding long run unrestricted coeﬃcients of the cointegrating relation-
ships, we employed smaller scale VAR(q) models, separately for each of the 21 entities of the model.
These estimations were based on a country-speciﬁc VAR model consisting of 9 variables (5 endogenous
variables, 3 weakly exogenous star variables and the oil price for each entity. For the case of China,
there are 4 endogenous variables due to lack of data for the gross capital formation). In particular,
we imposed the appropriate long-run restrictions to the set of 9 variables in each VAR model in order
to retrieve the long run unrestricted values of the c1i, c2i, c3i, a1i, a2i, a3i, β1i, β2i and β3i parameters as
described under the long run relationships which our analysis takes into account (see the relevant Table
on page 16). The estimations of the long run relationships which imposed in the GVAR analysis are
presented in Table 4.
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the shape of the persistence proﬁles. Here, we follow the modelling strategy suggested
by BCS given that the estimation of the long-run cointegrating vectors is very sensitive
to the number of selected lags. Using Monte Carlo experiments, BCS show that the
sensitivity of estimated cointegrating vectors was driven by the dimensionality problem
of large-scale country-speciﬁc VARX* models (9 variables). Motivated by these ﬁndings,
BSC focus on a smaller-scale VARX* models including a sub-set of country-speciﬁc vari-
ables. A cointegrating vector was imposed only if there is evidence (varying from 1 to
3 vectors in our case) from the smaller-scale models of cointegrating vectors and only
those cointegrating vectors which are consistent with the relevant theory. The estimated
(theory-based) cointegrating vectors were imposed in the full country-speciﬁc VARX*.
Tests for the validity of the implied overidentifying restrictions were also implemented in
the latter. The tests of overidentifying restrictions were based on a likelihood-ratio test
using bootstrapped critical values at the 1% signiﬁcance level.36 Finally, we impose only
the long-run relations that satisfy the likelihood-ratio test and at the same time exhibit
satisfying Persistence Proﬁles (PPs)37, impulse responses and stability of the estimated
coeﬃcients.
We estimate an unrestricted VARX*(pi, qi) by selecting the lag order of the domestic
variables pi based on the Akaike information criterion with p(i,max) = 2. Due to data
limitations, we include one lag for the foreign variables where qi = 1. Table 4 presents
the estimated cointegrating vectors of our model along with the likelihood-ratio test
results. We observe that all the imposed overidentifying restrictions hold as the null
hypothesis can not be rejected.38 Table 4 also shows that for the cases of NEA and
France cointegrating vectors provide evidence of export-oriented growth strategy pursued
by these countries. The estimated cointegrating vectors for the SEA and the UK satisfy
the import equation. Finally, there is evidence that the export equation and the trade
36Table 3 presents the individual speciﬁcations for the unrestricted estimation of the country-speciﬁc
VARX* models.
37See Figure A.2 in the Appendix.
38In general, we include overidentifying restrictions for 15 of the 21 entities of our model. For the
countries that we could not establish a long-run relationship (Brazil, Japan, Mexico, South Africa,
Sweden, Switzerland), we imposed the cointegrating vectors that suggested by the unrestricted VARX*
models.
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balance are stationary for the USA and China respectively.
4.2 Unit Root Tests
The implementation of the GVAR requires that the variables included in a country-
speciﬁc VARX*(pi, qi) are integrated of order one (I(1)). We test for unit root using the
weighted-symmetric Augmented Dickey-Fuller (WS ADF) introduced by Park and Fuller
(1995).39 Table A.2 in the Appendix summarizes results from the unit root tests. Results
suggest that we can not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for the large majority of
the domestic variables.40 Results also demonstrate that all foreign star variables and
the oil price are I(1) processes.
4.3 Weak Exogeneity Test
The main assumption underlying the estimation of a VARX*(pi,qi) is that the country-
speciﬁc foreign variables are x∗
it
are weakly exogenous. Weak exogeneity of x∗
it
in the
VECMX* (pi,qi) model implies that domestic variables xit do not aﬀect foreign variables
x∗
it
in the long run, without ruling out any short-run feedback between the two set of
variables.41 If the weak exogeneity assumption is not rejected then x∗
it
is considered as
a long-run forcing for xit .42 Following the approach of DdPS, we employed a test for
the weak exogeneity based on Johansen (1992) and Harbo et al. (1998) who suggested an
F -test to check whether the estimated error correction terms are statistically signiﬁcant
in the marginal distribution of x∗
it
. In particular, for each variable l of x∗
it
the following
auxiliary model is estimated:
39The lag length of the test was determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).
40However, some minor exceptions do exist. Real domestic output in Brazil and Ireland found to be I(2)
while in Mexico found I(0). Moreover, real exports are I(0) in the case of Japan and Switzerland (the
Swiss imports also found I(0)). In addition, the real eﬀective exchange rate in Mexico and Sweden
appears to be a I(0) process.
41The lag orders of the test for the domestic p∗
i
and foreign q∗
i
variables need not be the same with the
estimated VARX*(p∗
i
, q∗
i
) models. For this reason, we conduct the tests for weak exogeneity based on
both the lag structure determined by the AIC (where p∗
i
= 1 and q∗
i
= 1) and the lags of the underlying
estimated VARX* models. We also use a larger set of lags (p∗
i
= 4 and q∗
i
= 4) in order to capture any
sensitivity eﬀects of the model.
42This implies that the error-correction term do not provide any information about the marginal distri-
bution of x∗
it
.
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∆x∗
it,l
= αi,l +
∑ri
j=1
θi j,l ECMi j,t−1 +
∑p∗
i
s=1
φis,l∆xi,t−s +
∑q∗
i
s=1
ψis,l∆xˆ
∗
i,t−s + eit,l
where ECMi j,t−1, j = 1, . . . , ri are the estimated error correction terms which correspond to
the ri cointegrating relations (overidentifying restricted when long run relations imposed)
for the i-th country model. Note that, ∆xˆ∗i,t = (∆x
∗
′
it
,∆poilt) where ∆poilt is the global
variable of the oil price. The test for weak exogeneity is a joint test that θi j,l = 0 for
j = 1, 2, ...ri.
Results from the F-test are summarized in Table 5 and indicate that the null hypoth-
esis, at the 5% signiﬁcance level, is rejected for 16 out of the 83 foreign variables (19% of
the cases).43 It is worth noting that when we increase the lag order of the VARX*(p∗
i
, q∗
i
)
to p∗
i
= 4 and q∗
i
= 4, the null hypothesis is rejected only in 7 out of the 83 foreign
variables (8%).44 Overall, weak exogeneity can not be rejected.
4.4 The Impact Elasticities between the Domestic and the For-
eign Variables of the Model
An informative aspect of our analysis involves the contemporaneous eﬀects of the foreign
variables to their domestic counterparts, which can be interpreted as the impact elastic-
ities of the former variables to the latter. These are derived from the country-speciﬁc
VECMX* estimations. High impact elasticities would reﬂect the connectedness of the
global economy and the interdependence of the domestic variables across countries. Ta-
ble 6 presents the impact elasticities between domestic and foreign variables along with
the associated heteroscedasticity consistent Newey and West t-ratio's.
Most of these elasticities are high in magnitude and statistically signiﬁcant. For ex-
ample, we observed that in most countries/regions, the elasticity of real net export output
captured through the impact of ny∗
it
on nyit is positive and signiﬁcant. In particular, in
SEA and China there is evidence that a 1% change in the foreign real net export output
(i.e. ny∗
it
) is linked with positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects by 0.28% and 0.29%
43Note that the null hypothesis is rejected for the foreign output of France and China and for the real
eﬀective exchange rate of the NEA and the USA.
44All exogeneity test have been implemented conditional on the theory-based overidentifying restrictions.
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respectively on their domestic counterparts (i.e. nyit); UK and France will observe an
impact increase in their domestic output by 0.36% and 0.17% respectively. Interestingly,
the Korean domestic output has the greatest impact elasticity (1.42) which is compatible
with the outward-oriented structure of the Korean economy. Alternatively, we observed
a weak contemporaneous and no signiﬁcant dependence of the real US output by the
foreign activity.45
Table 6 also provides evidence that the impact elasticity of real eﬀective exchange rate
(reerit and reer∗it) is negative and signiﬁcant in export-oriented economies such as NEA,
the UK, Japan and Ireland. This implies that a global appreciation is associated with
a domestic depreciation of the exporting economies, which has positive eﬀects on their
competitiveness. Separately, when we examine the response of gross capital formation
(gc fit and gc f ∗it ), we observe that in most of the countries it is positive and mainly
signiﬁcant, especially for the developed economies.46
4.5 Average Pair-Wise Cross Section Correlations
An extension of the diagnostics concerning the weak-exogeneity of the foreign variables
in the sense that Cov(x∗
it
, uit) → 0 when N → ∞ is provided by the average cross-
section pair-wise correlations of the country-speciﬁc error terms. This informal test oﬀers
evidence of the degree at which the constructed foreign variables act to reduce cross-
section correlations in the GVAR model.
Table 7 presents the average pair-wise cross-sectional correlations for the level and
the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the endogenous variables, as well as the associated model's residu-
als.47 Results show that the average cross-section correlations for the levels of endogenous
45This is consistent with the argument that the US is a relatively closed economy.
46Exception to this is capital elasticities for the Asian economies (Japan, Korea, India and Indonesia)
which are negative indicating a trade-oﬀ in the allocation of investments between the Western and the
Asian economies.
47For example, the average pair-wise correlation of real output of country i is given by:
nyi = (1/N)
∑N
j=1
ρi j(nyi j)
where ρi j is the correlation of the real output of country i with country j, N is the number of countries
included in our sample. The residuals are obtained after estimating all country-speciﬁc V ARX∗(pi, qi)
models.
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variables are high with the exception of the real eﬀective exchange rate. The highest cor-
relations are observed in the trade variables with an average of 97% whilst the correlations
for the cases of net trade output and capital formation vary between 75% and 83%. When
the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the variables is considered, the correlations fall substantially for all
variables and for all countries.48 Finally, the residual interdependencies for all VARX*
models are relatively small which enhance the view that the weakly exogenous foreign
variables successfully capture the common factors among the variables.
4.6 Structural Stability Tests
An issue that can arise in our empirical framework is the presence of structural breaks.
We employ a battery of tests to determine the stability of the estimated parameters of the
country-speciﬁc models. As the short-run parameters reﬂect the propagation of shocks
across countries, we focus on the stability of the short-run coeﬃcients in the VECMX*
models. Following Ploberger and Kramer (1992) our set of structural stability tests is
based on the cumulative sums of the OLS residual tests denoted by PKsup and PKmsq.
We also employed the Nyblom (1989) test for time-varying parameters and sequential
Wald tests such as QLR, MW and APW.49
Table 8 summarizes the results obtained from the structural stability test at the
5% signiﬁcance level under the null hypothesis of parameter stability. Evidence from
structural stability tests are rather mixed. In particular, using the PKsup and PKmsq tests
the null hypothesis was rejected in 11 and 10 cases respectively out of the possible 105.
However, results obtained from the non-robust version of sequential Wald tests indicate
a high rejection rate of the null hypothesis varying from 40% to 50%. These results
could be rather worrying but the heteroscedasticity-robust version of these tests provide
a diﬀerent outcome with the rejection rate being halved in most cases.50 Furthermore,
48For example, the average cross-section correlations have declined in net export real output and gross
capital formation to 3% and 7% respectively.
49Note that PKsup and PKmsq refer to maximal OLS cumulative sum (CUSUM) statistics. QLR refers
to the likelihood ratio statistic proposed by Quandt (1960) while MW refers to a Wald statistic based
on Hansen (1992) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994). APW is an exponential average statistic based
also on the work of Andrews and Ploberger (1994). For further details on structural stability test
statistics see Dees et al. (2007b).
50It is worth noting that results vary across the diﬀerent endogenous variables. For example, the rejection
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the rejection of the null hypothesis was mainly driven by breaks in the error variance
and not on the parameter coeﬃcient. We account for the problem of possible variation
of error variances by using robust standard errors when investigating the impact of the
foreign variables.
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we examine the dynamic behaviour of the estimated GVAR model. We
focus on the global transmission mechanisms of real demand-side shocks and real ex-
pansionary shocks with a particular focus on the degree of regional interdependencies
among northern and southern euro-zone. We also assess the domestic and international
eﬀects of changes in real competitiveness based on diﬀerent simulations of real eﬀective
exchange rate shocks. To investigate the dynamic properties of the model, we employ the
generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) as proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and
developed further by Pesaran and Shin (1998). We do so because of (i) the absence of
strong prior information and (ii) the multi-country setting that includes 105 endogenous
variables. These two factors make the identiﬁcation of structural shocks in the underlying
structural model particularly challenging.
Unlike the conventional orthogonalized impulse response functions, the GIRFs are
order-invariant. Although they reﬂect the impact of a unit shock and not the impact
of an unobserved structural shock, they can still provide useful information concerning
the dynamic properties of the model.51 Alternatively, we could impose either a recur-
sive structure or sign restrictions on the endogenous variables of a core country-region
assuming that shocks across countries are correlated.52 Note that while recursive identi-
ﬁcation based on exclusion restrictions has been severely criticized as being atheoretical
the sign-identiﬁed VAR models are only set identiﬁed. In particular, there is a wide range
rate for the trade variables is slightly higher than the other domestic variables which might be due to
the collapse of global trade in 2009.
51Indeed, in practice real demand, output and trade shocks are likely to be highly correlated across
the diﬀerent regions of the model. All shock responses refer to mean estimates of 2000 bootstrap
replications along with the corresponding 90% error bounds.
52The former approach has been followed by Dees et al. (2007a) while the latter from Eickmeier and Ng
(2011) and Georgiadis (2015).
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of structural models that satisfy the identifying sign- restrictions. The conventional prac-
tice was to report the central tendency proxied by the median of the impulse responses,
which satisfy the sign restriction. However, Fry and Pagan (2011) and Kilian (2011);
Kilian and Lütkepohl (2017) argue that the vector of the median is not the median of the
vector so that median responses is likely to stem from diﬀerent structural models. Fry
and Pagan (2011) suggest selecting the impulse response that minimizes the distance from
the median response across models and horizons. However, Kilian and Murphy (2012)
and Inoue and Kilian (2013) argue that the posterior median response function can be
very misleading about the most likely dynamic response in the sign-identiﬁed models.53
It is clear that there is no consensus of which statistic to report about the identiﬁcation
of theory-consistent structural shocks. Therefore, we focus on the implication of GIRFs
which provide useful information about the dynamic properties of country-speciﬁc shocks,
which are assumed to be correlated across countries and regions.
We pay special attention to the interaction of shocks emanated from the NEA and
SEA respectively. In doing so, we also estimate a small-scale GVAR including only the
two regions (i.e. NEA and SEA) and we test for exogeneity of the endogenous variables.
Evidence of exogeneity will help to identify the spillover of shocks across the two regions.54
Table A.3, in the Appendix, presents exogeneity test among the NEA and SEA variables.
There is a strong evidence that when we estimate a GVAR including only NEA and
SEA for the large majority of the cases we can not reject the null of exogeneity. An
exception to this is the capital formation which found to be endogenous in most cases.
This implies that shocks across the two regions are exogenous while they are endogenous
within regions.
53Inoue and Kilian (2013) show that the most likely structural model can be computed by the model of
the joint distribution of admissible models. Inoue and Kilian (2013) also propose a measure based on
the highest-posterior density of credible sets that characterize the joint uncertainty of all admissible
structural models.
54Note that identiﬁcation of individual shocks will still require sign or zero restrictions.
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5.1 Shocks to the Euro Area Domestic Variables
In what follows we examine the time proﬁle of shocks to macroeconomic variables. In
particular, we simulate the following scenarios: i) the impact of a positive non-export
real output shock to the NEA on SEA variables; ii) the eﬀects of a positive shock to
real imports of both the NEA and the SEA; iii) we simulate the response of the global
economy to a real exchange rate depreciation shock of the SEA; iv) the eﬀects of positive
output shock emanated from the US; v) we consider the impact of a negative oil supply
shock.
5.1.1 Positive Real Output shock to the NEA
Figure 2a illustrates the impact of a positive one standard-deviation shock to the non-
export real output of the NEA. We observe that, both in the NEA and the SEA, there
is a signiﬁcant increase of output which remains positive both in the medium and the
long-run.55 In response to a positive output shock, investments in the NEA increase and
current account deteriorates.56 The counter-cyclical movement of the current account
is consistent both with the traditional and modern theories of current account model.
The traditional theories claim that an increase in output will increase demand for foreign
goods and this worsens the current account. Modern theories argue that an increase
of output might reﬂect a positive productivity shock which in turn will have a positive
impact on investments.57 Therefore, an increase of output driven by a positive and
persistent productivity shock will increase investment and worsen the current account.58
There is also evidence that in the SEA, there is a deterioration of the trade balance as
exports decline signiﬁcantly while the response of imports is not statistically signiﬁcant
from zero. Furthermore, the response of investment is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
due to a signiﬁcant appreciation of the real exchange rate. Note that an appreciation
55In particular, on the impact output increases by 0.35% and 0.05% in NEA and SEA respectively.
56Note that we have poxied investments by using gross capital formation.
57Mendoza (1991) shows that an increase of real interest rate is a likely response to a positive and
persistent productivity shock.
58Current account is given by CA = (Y+ rB - T) - C - I + (T - G) or CA = Private Saving - Investment
- Budget Deﬁcit. Note that I denotes investment and private saving is the sum of GDP (i.e. Y ) plus
income on net foreing assets (i.e. rB minus taxes and (i.e. T ) and consumption (i.e. C ) while budget
deﬁcit is the diﬀerence between goverment spendig and taxes (i.e. G-T ).
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of the real exchange rate might reﬂect either an improvement in terms of trade (i.e. a
decline of foreign prices) or an increase in unit labour cost (ULC).59,60 An appreciation of
the real exchange rate driven by an increase of ULC might reﬂect capital misallocation in
SEA.61 This is consistent with evidence provided by Gopinath et al. (2017) and Jaumotte
and Sodsriwiboon (2010). However, Chen et al. (2013) show that appreciation of the real
exchange rate in the SEA is mainly due to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
In summary, a positive output shock in NEA has a negative impact on the trade balance
of both NEA and SEA.
Figure 2b indicates the spillovers eﬀects of a positive shock to the non-export real
output of the NEA to the real output of the rest of the economies available in our sample.
In general, there is a positive and signiﬁcant response in European economies such as
France, Switzerland and Sweden while non-export output in the USA will respond in an
insigniﬁcant manner. Finally, there is a noticeable positive impact on Asian economies
including China, India and Japan.
5.1.2 Positive Expansionary shock to the NEA
Figure 3a depicts the impulse responses of NEA and SEA variables to a positive one-
standard-deviation shock to the NEA real imports. There is evidence of a strong positive
response of real import and cross-capital formation in both regions (i.e. NEA and SEA).
A positive response of investment might be due to an appreciation of nominal exchange
59Chen et al. (2013) show that we can decompose the real exchange rate into three components:
RE R =
(
SP∗NEAT
PT
)αγ (
PEA−T
P
)γ(1−α) (
(SWNEA)α(W∗EA)1−α
W
)1−γ
where S is the nominal exchange rate deﬁned as domestic prices relative to foreign prices. Note that
in our empirical estimation, we used data deﬁned the other way around. P∗NEA−T is the price level
of non-eurozone trading partners, P∗EA−T is the euro-zone trading partners, α is the share of trade
with the non euro-zone countries, γ indicates the share of tradable goods and P is the domestic price
level. An appreciation of will improve the terms of trade as reﬂected by the ﬁrst term while worsens
the relative wage competitiveness proxied by the third term.
60King and Rebelo (1999) show that productivity shocks will lead to an increase in the real interest
rate and an appreciation of the real exchange rate which, in turn, will aﬀect exports negatively.
Appreciation of real exchange rate is also consistent with Corsetti et al. (2006).
61Note that the non-signiﬁcant response of real exchange rate in NEA might be due to the reduction
of ULC which oﬀset an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, For further details see Chen et al.
(2013).
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rate which raises the real return on domestic investments.62 More formally, Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (2000) argue that due to the limited integration of capital market there is home
bias on demand shocks. Therefore, a positive demand shock will appreciate the terms
of trade and improve the real return of domestic investments.63 Yet, the response of
output in the SEA is insigniﬁcant while there is an initial decline in output in NEA for
two quarters following the shock. The frail response of output to an import shock might
be driven by a boosted of exports as observed in Figure 3b. However, exports in both
regions (i.e. NEA and SEA) increase less than imports following the import shock in
NEA. Therefore, an expansionary demand shock in NEA leads to a deterioration of the
NEA and SEA current account, albeit the deterioration is rather marginal.
We next focus on the impact of real NEA import shocks to the exports of the countries
included in our sample. Figure 3b indicates that an expansionary shock in NEA yields
a statistically signiﬁcant increase in the global real exports highlighting the importance
of the trade linkages in the transmission of shocks around the world.64 This implies
that increasing imports in NEA might be used as an adjustment mechanism for the
trade imbalances between NEA and SEA. Furthermore, Figure 3b also shows that import
expansion in NEA has a positive impact on the exports of France, UK, Sweden, Norway
and Switzerland. This implies that increasing imports in NEA might be used as an
adjustment mechanism for the trade imbalances in euro area.
62Figure 3a indicates that there is no a signiﬁcant response of real exchange rate to NEA demand
shock. In fact, in the SEA we observed that on the impact real exchange rate depreciate. However,
Chen et al. (2013) show that for the period 2000-2010 real appreciation of the euro primarily reﬂected
nominal appreciation in all current account deﬁcit countries. In Germany, the real exchange rate
was at equilibrium level due to a reduction of ULC that oﬀsets the nominal appreciation of the euro.
Therefore, an internal devaluation pursued by the debtor countries after the crisis has cancelled out
the nominal appreciation of euro.
63The terms of trade is given by PD
PF
where PD is the price of domestically produced goods while PF
is the price of goods produced in foreign countries. Corsetti and Müller (2006) show that the return
to investment in real terms is given by: Real Return to investment = (Marginal product in terms of
domestic goods)× PD
P
where P denotes the price of domestic consumption. Therefore, an increase in
the ratio due to an expansionary ﬁscal shock and home bias will have a positive impact on the real
return of domestic investments.
64Concerning the response of real exports in NEA and SEA we observed an increase of 0.6% and 0.4%
respectively.
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5.1.3 Positive Expansionary shock to the SEA
The third shock that we simulate examines whether SEA relies on domestic consumption
as a mechanism of economic growth. Therefore, Figure 4a shows the impact of a positive
one standard-deviation shock on the real imports in the SEA. In general, we observed that
there is a positive and signiﬁcant response of all SEA variables (imports, output, gross
capital formation and real exchange rate) while in NEA there is a signiﬁcant increase
only for real imports. We also observe in Figure 4b that there is a positive signiﬁcant
increase of exports both in NEA and SEA.65 However, while the response of export in
NEA crowding out the response of import the reverse is true in the SEA. Our results
provide support of the view that the co-existence of two growth strategies led to the
accumulation of trade imbalances between NEA and SEA. In particular, NEA countries
have built on institutions and policies that promote the ELG policies. Alternatively, SEA
economies, rely on increased domestic demand as a mechanism of growth promotion. This
structure generated cumulative current account surpluses and incited external lending in
NEA mirror by current account deﬁcit and net borrowing in SEA.
5.1.4 Real Depreciation of the SEA
In this part, we examine the view that improving competitiveness in the SEA will accel-
erate the current account adjustment. Note that although demand shocks both in NEA
and SEA have a positive impact on investments and exports of SEA, the current account
adjustment was incomplete. In particular, there is a deterioration of the current account
due to a higher increase of imports than exports following a demand shock as proxied by a
shock on imports. Therefore, we investigate the role of the real exchange rate as a mech-
anism of current account adjustment. In so doing, we provide information concerning
the argument that demand shocks accompanied by an improvement in competitiveness
can help to eliminate trade imbalance within the euro-zone. To this end, we consider the
impact of a one-standard-deviation negative shock (i.e. a depreciation) to the SEA real
65The eﬀect on other European economies is also statistically signiﬁcant with French, the UK and
Swedish exports increasing by approximately 0.25% after one year. There is also evidence of a positive
eﬀect on Chinese, Turkish and Japanese exports.
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eﬀective exchange rate on both the real exchange rates and on the real exports of the rest
of the countries in our sample. Figure 5a provides evidence that for most of the euro-area
countries real exchange rate depreciates but by less than the depreciation of the real ex-
change rate in SEA.66 For example, while the real exchange rate in SEA depreciates by
0.8%, it is marginally signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in NEA and insigniﬁcant for the
UK and Switzerland. Alternatively, for the non euro area countries real exchange rates
appreciate but in most cases, appreciation is not statistically diﬀerent from zero.67
Figure 5b indicates that a depreciation of the real eﬀective exchange rate increased real
exports in SEA by 0.7% per quarter while the response of real imports is not signiﬁcant.
We also observed that a depreciation has a negative impact on real output and investment
but are signiﬁcant only in the short-run (i.e. 2 quarters following the shock). This might
be due to the negative impact that a depreciation has on the real return of domestic
investment.68 Alternatively, the response of NEA variables to a depreciation shock of the
real exchange rate of the SEA is rather frail. Only the real output decreases signiﬁcantly
but only a few quarters. This ﬁnding is in line with Belke and Dreger (2013) who suggest
the depreciation of the real exchange rate of debtor euro-zone countries as a tool to
current account adjustment.
5.2 Shocks to the US domestic variables
The second set of shocks concerns the domestic variables of the USA. In particular, we
are interested in examining two widespread issues in the literature. First, a positive
shock on the real domestic demand of the US economy and its implications on global
non-export real output and real exports. The dominant role of the USA in the global
economy is expected to induce notable eﬀects on international trade. Second, we assess
the impact of the real exchange rate depreciation of the US dollar on the US current
account adjustment process. Indeed, it has been pointed out that a depreciation of the
66This might reﬂect a reduction of ULC imposed by structural reforms in SEA after the ﬁnancial crisis
of 2008.
67In particular, the real exchange rates in the USA and China appreciate statistically signiﬁcant by a
0.3% and 0.4% respectively after 4 quarters. There is also evidence of appreciation in Japan, Turkey
and emerging Asian economies. Note that in all cases appreciation was not statistically signiﬁcant.
68For further details see Corsetti et al. (2006).
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US dollar is imperative in order to meliorate the external deﬁcit of the USA (see Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ, 2005).
5.2.1 Positive Shock to the Output of the US.
Figure 6a shows that a positive one standard deviation shock on the US non-export real
output leads to an increase in investments and deterioration of the current account. In
particular the ﬁrst year following the shock, real gross capital formation and real imports
rise 1.4% and 0.8% respectively. Deterioration of the current account is reﬂected by
the stronger positive response of imports compared to the response of exports to output
shock. US real exports increase by 0.2% on impact and by 0.4% in the long-run. This
is because an increase of output driven by a productivity shock will increase investments
and worsen the current account. Alternatively, if an output increase is due to a demand
shock such as ﬁscal expansion, investment will increase because the marginal product of
capital in terms of consumption will increase.
Figure 6b show that the eﬀects of the real non-export US output shocks on the real
output of the rest of the world (i.e. countries including in our sample) are rather weak.
The shock is accompanied by a positive and statistically signiﬁcant response of non-export
real output only in the cases of Australia and New Zealand. The response of real exports
to the US real non-export output shock is, in general, positive and signiﬁcant with the
higher amounts appeared in Brazilian, Canadian and Japanese exports (see Figure 6c).
The real exports of the European countries, including the north and south sub-regions of
the euro area, increase by approximately 0.2% each quarter during the ﬁrst year following
the shock. The results clearly highlight the importance of the US domestic demand in
the evolution of the global trade.
5.2.2 A real depreciation of the US economy
The eﬀects of the real exchange rate depreciation of the US dollar on domestic variables
are displayed in Figure 7a. We observe that the current account improves as exports
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increase signiﬁcantly while imports decline, albeit non-signiﬁcantly.69 Our evidence pro-
vides support to the view that real exchange rate can be used as an instrument to correct
the US current account deﬁcit.70 The conclusion that can be drawn is that competitive-
ness in the US economy tends to stimulate the external adjustment when studied under
a global context. However, reduction of the US current account balance might has a
signiﬁcant impact on the European economy and the other countries in our sample. In
Figure 7b there is no any evidence that the depreciation of the US real exchange rate has
any impact on the exports of the outside world.71 This is so because the US is rather a
closed economy.
5.2.3 A positive shock to the global variable of real oil price
The ﬁnal scenario involves one s.d. positive shock (5.1% on impact) in the real oil price
(Figure 8a). The shock has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the non-export
real output in a plethora of oil importing countries (see Figure 8b); NEA, UK, China and
India face an approximately 0.1% decrease in domestic output after 2 quarters of the
shock. The economy of the USA is negatively aﬀected only in the long-run (2 years after
the shock).72 It is worth noting that, while an oil price shock aﬀects negatively NEA, it
does not have any signiﬁcant impact on SEA. This might reﬂect that NEA economies are
based on ELG policies which highlight the importance of supply side of the economy as
a key factor of economic growth.
Figure 8c indicates that the oil price shock has a positive impact on the real exports
of NEA, SEA, France, UK US, China and Japan. For example, real exports in NEA
increased by 0.35% and in SEA by 0.25%, respectively.73 Chen et al. (2013) show that
69Figure 7a indicates that US real exports increase by 0.2% on impact and increases approximately to
0.8% per quarter one year following the shock.
70Alternatively, IMF, 2004, 2005 advocates domestic ﬁscal consolidation as a necessary measure to
restore the US trade imbalances.
71European economies, for example, do not show any statistically signiﬁcant responses. The only sig-
niﬁcant responses arise from the increased Korean and Brazilian real exports and the decreased of
Australian real exports.
72On the other hand, real output in Canada and Brazil is increased by 0.07% and 0.2% the ﬁrst couple
of quarters following the shock. Domestic output in Ireland and Turkey has also a positive short-run
response.
73The response of imports, which we do not present here for the sake of brevity, is of the same magnitude.
These results are available from the authors upon request.
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higher income of oil-producing countries will increase demand for machinery and equip-
ment goods produced, for example, in Germany. However, Figure 8d indicates that an oil
price shock leads to an appreciation of the real eﬀective exchange rate in NEA without
aﬀecting the real exchange rate of SEA.74 Although there is an appreciation of the real
exchange rate of NEA, exports increase signiﬁcantly in response to an oil price shock.
Therefore, oil prices shocks do not aﬀect trade imbalances in the sense that they have a
positive and symmetric impact on both exports and imports.
5.3 Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
A complementary extension of the impulse response functions is the traditional analysis
of forecast error variance decomposition. Under the GVAR model, the implemented
GIRFs correspond to Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (GFEVDs)
as explained by DdPS. In this case, GFEVDs show the proportion of the n-step ahead
forecast error variance of the i-th element of xt accounted for the innovations in the j-
th element of xt . Note that this approach allows for contemporaneous correlations, the
shocks across countries are not orthogonal, and are invariant to variable ordering. Hence,
GFEVDs need not sum to unity.
This section presents the GFEVDs of some selected scenarios of interest, focusing on
euro area real trade ﬂows. Table 9 shows the proportion of forecast error variance for the
top 12 determinants of the NEA real imports and the SEA real exports and imports, for
the ﬁrst 12 quarters. Total sum indicates the sum of GFEVDs contributions across all
countries. The results point out that NEA real imports depend primarily on domestic
variables such as imports, exports and gross capital formation which account for the half
variation during the ﬁrst year. The real exchange rate and non-export real output of NEA
have a minor impact while the oil price and SEA domestic variables hold a respectable
contribution, especially after 2 quarters. SEA real exports depend on domestic variables
as well, where the contributions of real imports and real exchange rate are important in
74There is also evidence that the real exchange rates in the UK, Canada, Australia, Korea, New Zealand
and Norway appreciate by 0.3% - 0.4% two quarters after the shocks. The shock renders a negative
eﬀect of approximately 0.4% on the real exchange rates of the major economies which rely on imported
energy such as the USA, China and India, during the ﬁrst couple of quarters.
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explaining SEA real exports variations. This conﬁrms the import dependence of exports
in the SEA and the signiﬁcant role of competitiveness. Interestingly, NEA real trade
ﬂows explain approximately 10% of the SEA export variation after one year while the
contribution of the non-export output of NEA and oil price is similar. In addition, a
major contributor of the SEA real imports (except the variable itself) is the domestic
gross capital formation followed by domestic real exports and non-export real output.
Despite the heterogeneity in the dispersion of contributions, we also trace an important
inﬂuence by the NEA real trade ﬂows. The GFEVDs analysis for the euro area real trade
variables conﬁrms the GIRFs outcome that there is a strong relationship between NEA
and SEA real trade ﬂows. As expected, domestic variables are the main determinants of
the variation of the GFEVDs in each region.
Table 10 contains the GFEVDs results for the real imports of the two major global
importers, China and the USA. For the case of U.S. real imports, the contribution can
be attributed to domestic variables (imports, gross capital formation, exports and non-
export real output) as they account for the 57% of the total variation during the ﬁrst
year. With respect to foreign variables, NEA, French and Swedish originated exports
and real exchange rates are also signiﬁcant determinants of the U.S. import forecast
error variance decomposition. Moreover, Canadian real trade ﬂows are among the top
determinants of U.S. real imports which is in align with the strong relationship between
the two economies. The case of Chinese real imports oﬀers heterogeneous results, as we
can not trace a particular geographical pattern to the top determinants of the Chinese
import forecast error variance decomposition. A fact that stands out is the conﬁrmation
of the trade balance stationarity; Chinese exports account for the 20% variation in the
long-run import performance (after 3 years).
6 Conclusion
The global imbalances that emerged after the 2000s have been blamed as a contribu-
tor to the recent ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2009) argue that current
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account surpluses from emerging economies have been used to fund deﬁcits in devel-
oped economies, which in turn has fueled the risk-taking behavior of the latter countries,
thereby sowing the seed of the global ﬁnancial crisis.75 Therefore, it is important to
investigate sources and patterns of trade imbalances. The aim of our study is to analyze
trade imbalances within the euro-zone, accounting for the global macroeconomic environ-
ment. The co-existence of two growth models within the euro-zone made inevitable the
development of trade imbalances between the north and the south euro area: the former
with an export-oriented economy while the latter based on domestic consumption.
There is a view supported by the US Treasury (2017) and Krugman (2013) that the
current account adjustment within the euro-zone should be symmetric in the sense that
NEA surpluses should shrink along with the SEA deﬁcits. The counter-argument of this
view endured by Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) is that the SEA should pursue poli-
cies that increase government saving, productivity and competitiveness through internal
devaluation. Our paper contributes to the debate by evaluating the view that an ex-
pansionary policy from NEA accompanied by an increased competitiveness in SEA can
accelerate the adjustment of trade imbalances within the euro area.
We do so by using a GVARmodel for 28 countries including the NEA, SEA regions, the
USA, China and other European and non European countries. The GVAR model provides
a framework that allows investigating the spill-over eﬀects of demand or competitiveness
shocks emanating from any country in our sample. Here we focus on the spillover eﬀects
of demands shocks from NEA and SEA across the two regions. In doing so, we can
provide information on the argument that expansionary policy from NEA can be used
as a mechanism to boost economic growth and current account adjustment in the SEA.
However, current account adjustment driven mainly by demand forces is likely to unwind
if the economy moves to a diﬀerent phase of business cycle. For example, although an
expansionary policy pursued during expansion might improve the current account of SEA
countries, it will have unwelcome eﬀects once the economic slowdown and move into a
75Alternatively, Borio and Disyatat (2011) argues that from a macroprudential point of view the main
factor that drives the international crisis of 2008 was the phenomenal increase of gross capital ﬂows.
They show that the link between the ﬁnancial crisis and trade imbalances was rather weak.
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recession. Therefore, we also investigate the impact of competitiveness shocks as reﬂected
by a devaluation of the real eﬀective exchange rate of the SEA on the current account of
both regions.
Empirical results support the argument that current account adjustment in euro-zone
should be symmetric. In particular, we observe that although positive demand shocks,
in both regions, as proxied by an increase in imports has positive eﬀects on exports and
investment, current accounts deteriorate or at best remain stable. However, there is evi-
dence that a devaluation of the real eﬀective exchange rate in SEA leads to an increase
in exports without aﬀecting imports. Therefore, our results highlight that the impera-
tive external adjustment of the SEA sub-region should be composed of two coordinated
policies: First, increased consumption of the NEA, which will stimulate the demand for
imported goods in the sub-region and thus, will expand the export sector of the SEA.
Second, a devaluation of the real exchange rate in the SEA, possibly through the mecha-
nism of wage and labour costs, should provide a valuable policy tool for competitiveness
and current account adjustment in the sub-region.
Our results should be translated with caution. From the perspective of the SEA if
one has to choose a policy then an internal devaluation will have a positive eﬀect on their
exports and negative (but not statistically signiﬁcant) on their imports. The alternative
policy would be an expansionary shock to the NEA. This would aﬀect SEA exports
positively (not as much as in the previous scenario though) and their imports positively.
The cautionary note that should not be underestimated here is that the devaluation in the
SEA might have a negative impact on investment and economic growth (see Corsetti et al.,
2006). To answer these type of questions we need to decompose the devaluation of real
exchange rate into components driven by the nominal exchange rate and into components
due to a reduction of ULC. We will also need to include data on productivity so that we
can have a proxy of the real return of capital as stressed by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000)
and Corsetti et al. (2006). We leave this for a future work.
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Table 1: Countries and Regions in the GVAR Model
China South Europe Scandinavia Rest of the World
France Greece Norway India
Japan Italy Sweden Indonesia
UK Portugal Korea
USA Spain South Africa
Turkey
North Europe Other Developed Economies Latin America
Austria Australia Brazil
Belgium Canada Mexico
Finland Ireland
Germany Switzerland
Netherlands New Zealand
Table 2: Trade Weights of the GVAR model
Country/Region China France Japan NEA SEA Sweden UK USA
China 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.25
France 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.44 0.20 0.02 0.07 0.08
Japan 0.33 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.22
NEA 0.12 0.17 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.12 0.12
SEA 0.07 0.18 0.02 0.37 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.08
Sweden 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.43 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.07
UK 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.32 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.13
USA 0.20 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00
Note: Trade weights based on data from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.
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Table 3: The speciﬁcation for the country-speciﬁc unrestricted VARX* models
Country/Region
Individual VECMX*models speciﬁcation
pi qi Deterministics Case r Endogenous Variables Exogenous Variables
USA 2 1 IV 3 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit, poil} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
}
North Europe 2 1 III 1 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
South Europe 2 1 III 1 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
UK 1 1 III 1 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
France 2 1 III 1 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
China 2 1 III 1 {nyit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
Japan 2 1 IV 2 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
Korea 2 1 IV 2 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
Canada 2 1 IV 3 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
Australia 1 1 III 1 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
Ireland 2 1 III 1 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
Sweden 2 1 III 1 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
Switzerland 2 1 IV 3 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
Norway 2 1 IV 2 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
New Zealand 2 1 III 1 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
Mexico 2 1 III 2 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
Brazil 2 1 IV 3 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
Indonesia 2 1 III 2 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
India 2 1 III 0 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
Turkey 2 1 III 2 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
South Africa 2 1 III 1 {nyit, kit, exit, imit, reerit} {ny∗it, k
∗
it
, reer∗
it
, poil}
Notes: Deterministics case IV indicates constant and restricted trend in the VECMX* estimation. Case III indicates only constant. r
refers to the number of cointegrating relationships as indicated by the Johansen's test.
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Table 4: Over-identiﬁed Long Run Restrictions in the GVAR model
Country/ Region Imposed Restrictions Theoretical equation r LLR(df) 99% CV
Australia nyt − 0.90kt − 0.38ext + 0.47imt ELGH 1 16.96(8) 31.34
Brazil 3
Canada ext − imt TB∼ I(0) 1 51.72(9) 53.83
China ext − imt TB∼ I(0) 1 24.15(7) 32.65
France nyt − 1.54kt − 0.58ext + 1.18imt ELGH 1 27.05(8) 34.92
Indonesia imt − 0.38ext − 1.01nyt − 0.44reert Imports Equation 1 26.85(8) 33.60
India ext − imt TB∼ I(0) 1 12.69(8) 42.05
Ireland nyt − 0.55k − 0.60ext + 0.53imt ELGH 1 16.29(8) 31.75
Japan 2
Korea ext − imt TB∼ I(0) 1 29.00(9) 46.09
Mexico 2
North Europe nyt − 3.14kt − 3.38ext + 5.02imt ELGH 1 10.68(8) 29.92
Norway nyt − 2.29kt − 0.35ext + 3.03imt ELGH 1 46.08(9) 53.41
New Zealand ext − 0.69imt − 0.25ny∗t + 0.67reert Exports Equation 1 14.98(8) 29.81
South Africa
South Europe imt − 0.86ext − 0.94nyt − 1.02reert Imports Equation 1 22.61(8) 34.73
Sweden 1
Switzerland 3
Turkey
nyt − 0.55kt − 1.72ext + 1.67imt ELGH 2 46.95(14) 53.78
ext − 0.85imt − 0.41ny
∗
t + 0.17reert Exports Equation
UK imt − 0.57ext − 1.40nyt − 0.24reert Imports Equation 1 28.85(8) 31.78
USA ext − 0.47imt − 0.82ny∗t + 1.6reert Exports Equation 1 10.62(9) 31.77
Notes: Imposed restrictions refer to the theory-based equations that imposed to the cointegrating vector βi of each individual
VECMX*model. r refers to the number of cointegrating vectors imposed. Log-Likelihood Ratio test was based on 2000 bootstrapped
replications.
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Table 5: Weak Exogeneity Test of the Country Speciﬁc Foreign Variables and Oil Price
Country/Region
Foreign Variables
ny∗ k∗ reer∗ poil
USA F(1,134) 0.72 1.08 7.65*
North Europe F(1,134) 0.82 1.15 6.84* 2.81
South Europe F(1,134) 0.01 4.93* 0.36 2.72
UK F(1,134) 0.68 3.01 0.72 1.38
France F(1,134) 14.32* 1.85 0.41 0.57
China F(1,135) 8.58* 3.96* 0.37 1.76
Japan F(2,133) 0.09 2.78 0.53 1.59
Korea F(1,134) 0.70 0.33 0.69 2.08
Canada F(1,134) 7.84* 1.07 1.45 0.45
Australia F(1,134) 4.97* 1.03 0.00 0.00
Ireland F(1,134) 0.22 0.39 0.03 0.19
Sweden F(1,134) 0.43 0.50 0.01 1.42
Switzerland F(3,132) 0.46 0.68 0.42 4.15*
Norway F(1,134) 16.68* 1.98 2.00 1.42
New Zealand F(1,134) 0.06 18.90* 12.62* 0.15
Mexico F(2,133) 0.17 0.74 5.47* 0.31
Brazil F(3,132) 0.74 0.46 1.13 0.23
Indonesia F(1,134) 4.46* 0.06 1.31 4.51*
India F(1,134) 1.34 1.90 1.38 0.02
Turkey F(2,133) 0.33 0.29 5.18* 0.11
South Africa F(1,134) 1.05 2.21 0.13 0.06
Note: (*) indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of the test.
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Table 6: Impact Elasticities between Domestic and Foreign Variables
Country/Region
Domestic Variables
ny k reer
USA 0.07 0.60 0.11
[0.56] [3.28] [0.52]
North Europe 0.19 0.54 -0.44
[0.82] [3.56] [-2.85]
South Europe 0.28 0.54 0.31
[3.11] [3.66] [1.22]
UK 0.36 0.45 -1.78
[2.58] [1.86] [-3.78]
France 0.17 0.42 1.09
[2.92] [3.28] [5.90]
China 0.29 0.30
[2.10] [0.59]
Japan 0.30 -0.06 -0.92
[1.65] [-0.47] [-4.42]
India 0.27 -0.08 0.45
[1.86] [-0.65] [2.13]
Korea 1.42 -0.04 0.08
[2.16] [-0.10] [0.30]
Canada 0.35 0.45 0.03
[1.72] [2.02] [0.19]
Australia 0.23 0.57 0.26
[1.71] [2.21] [0.72]
Ireland -0.47 0.40 -0.82
[-0.85] [1.18] [-2.97]
Sweden 0.46 0.93 0.08
[3.31] [5.94] [0.21]
Switzerland 1.50 -0.25 -0.64
[1.19] [-0.44] [-1.93]
Note: Newey-West t-ratio's in brackets.
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Table 7: Average pair-wise cross section correlations
Country/Region
ny k ex im reer
Levels 1st Diﬀ. Levels 1st Diﬀ. Levels 1st Diﬀ. Levels 1st Diﬀ. Levels 1st Diﬀ.
USA 0.83 0.08 0.85 0.14 0.98 0.25 0.97 0.27 -0.06 -0.14
North Europe -0.14 0.05 0.83 0.12 0.98 0.23 0.98 0.26 0.03 -0.01
South Europe 0.76 0.09 0.73 0.14 0.98 0.27 0.95 0.27 0.02 0.04
UK 0.83 0.06 0.83 0.05 0.99 0.17 0.98 0.19 -0.06 -0.03
France 0.83 0.09 0.87 0.14 0.98 0.30 0.98 0.28 0.15 0.04
China 0.81 0.00 0.98 0.14 0.97 0.08 0.17 -0.04
Japan 0.75 0.03 0.44 0.08 0.98 0.28 0.96 0.25 -0.25 -0.18
Korea 0.78 0.05 0.84 0.04 0.98 0.12 0.98 0.11 0.19 0.09
Canada 0.79 0.06 0.87 0.13 0.96 0.20 0.98 0.25 0.27 0.14
Sweden 0.78 0.09 0.84 0.15 0.98 0.24 0.98 0.29 0.15 0.06
Switzerland -0.41 0.03 0.79 0.01 0.96 0.11 0.97 0.09 -0.17 -0.06
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Table 8: Structural Stability Tests, number of rejections of the null hypothesis
Structural Stability Tests
Domestic Variables (rejection %)
Numbers of rejections(%)
nyit kit exit imit reerit poil
PKsup 2(9.5) 1(5) 6(28.5) 2(9.5) 0(0) 0 11(10.4)
PKmsq 3(14.2) 1(5) 5(23.8) 1(4.8) 0(0) 0 10(9.5)
Nyblom 6(28.5) 7(35) 9(42.8) 6(28.5) 8(38) 1 37(35.2)
Robust-Nyblom 2(9.5) 4(20) 5(23.8) 5(23.8) 7(33) 1 24(22.8)
QLR 7(33) 9(45) 10(47.6) 13(61.9) 12(57.1) 1 52(49.5)
Robust-QLR 7(33) 6(30) 6(28.5) 3(14.2) 4(19) 0 26(24.7)
MW 7(33) 7(35) 9(42.8) 8(38) 10(47.6) 1 42(40)
Robust- MW 6(28.5) 5(25) 6(28.5) 4(19) 8(38) 0 29(27.6)
APW 9(42.8) 10(47.6) 9(42.8) 14(67) 12(57.1) 1 55(52.3)
Robust- APW 6(28.5) 5(25) 6(28.5) 4(19) 7(33) 0 28(27)
Note: All tests are conducted at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
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Table 9: GFEVD of the NEA and SEA real trade ﬂows
Proportion of
forecast error
variance
n-step quarters ahead
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
North Euro Area Real Imports (%)
North Euro Area im 83.23 73.53 70.67 69.60 69.09 68.84 68.75
North Euro Area ex 26.47 36.38 37.30 36.94 36.71 36.25 35.84
North Euro Area k 27.80 28.67 27.42 26.42 25.60 25.01 24.62
North Euro Area reer 7.78 7.93 8.41 8.63 8.83 8.87 8.87
Mexico im 6.72 6.12 6.20 6.25 6.33 6.42 6.47
Oil Price 3.26 6.06 6.42 6.63 6.64 6.58 6.51
North Euro Area ny 3.42 4.64 5.15 5.49 5.74 5.94 6.15
South Euro Area im 3.75 5.02 5.23 5.18 5.12 5.03 4.93
China ny 1.23 3.49 4.71 5.27 5.42 5.38 5.22
Japan ex 1.36 3.47 3.81 3.81 3.72 3.61 3.51
South Euro Area k 2.08 2.96 3.28 3.35 3.32 3.29 3.24
South Euro Area ex 1.84 3.11 3.28 3.25 3.19 3.14 3.09
Total Sum 232 253.3 258. 258.7 258.6 257.9 257.2
South Euro Area Real Exports (%)
South Euro Area ex 80.23 72.94 68.87 66.29 63.98 61.93 60.18
South Euro Area im 23.28 22.48 23.15 23.86 24.40 24.91 25.45
South Euro Area rer 3.78 8.69 11.73 14.27 16.48 18.21 19.63
North Euro Area ex 9.41 13.21 13.10 12.40 11.42 10.44 9.52
North Euro Area im 6.67 10.42 11.46 11.71 11.51 11.29 11.02
France ex 9.47 10.07 9.87 9.67 9.40 9.11 8.79
Japan ex 8.46 10.26 10.09 9.63 9.12 8.60 8.14
North Euro Area rer 2.54 5.24 6.78 7.71 8.44 8.88 9.21
Canada im 6.22 6.96 7.01 6.96 6.94 6.85 6.79
North Euro Area ny 2.60 4.14 5.22 5.80 6.23 6.53 6.73
Oil Price 3.98 5.46 5.77 5.72 5.48 5.26 5.00
South Euro Area ny 9.65 6.06 5.18 4.70 4.35 4.06 3.78
Total Sum 259.2 280.5 287.6 290.6 291.0 290.0 288.6
South Euro Area Real Imports (%)
South Euro Area im 78.18 70.10 67.37 66.16 65.62 65.36 65.10
South Euro Area k 31.01 36.58 37.47 37.96 38.32 38.44 38.51
South Euro Area ex 22.09 17.03 14.51 13.14 12.30 11.68 11.18
South Euro Area ny 1.61 11.50 14.49 15.80 16.55 16.99 17.34
North Euro Area im 9.06 10.12 9.91 9.70 9.52 9.39 9.27
North Euro Area ex 7.53 9.65 9.34 8.85 8.43 8.12 7.76
Sweden im 6.93 7.41 7.42 7.35 7.31 7.29 7.30
France ex 3.32 5.20 5.42 5.42 5.37 5.34 5.25
Japan ex 4.67 5.61 5.24 4.85 4.62 4.39 4.20
Canada im 4.77 4.81 4.55 4.43 4.37 4.36 4.28
Turkey ny 2.67 4.07 4.33 4.41 4.43 4.41 4.34
China ex 4.75 4.51 4.22 3.97 3.77 3.63 3.50
Total Sum 268.6 288.7 287.5 285.0 283.3 281.4 279.4
42
Chisiridis, K., Mouratidis, K. and Panagiotidis, T.
Table 10: GFEVD of the USA and China Real Imports
Proportion of
forecast error
variance
n-step quarters ahead
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
USA Real Imports (%)
USA im 85.81 74.45 70.04 67.14 64.62 62.43 60.54
USA k 32.08 43.79 44.04 43.73 43.17 42.30 41.33
USA ny 12.59 34.74 38.00 39.41 39.79 39.62 39.36
USA ex 12.24 17.82 17.85 17.66 17.29 16.77 16.28
France ex 6.25 7.27 7.59 7.79 7.95 7.91 7.87
North Euro Area rer 3.15 4.06 4.51 5.21 5.87 6.44 6.98
Canada im 5.16 3.76 3.67 3.66 3.64 3.62 3.59
Sweden ex 3.40 4.02 4.03 3.83 3.65 3.43 3.21
Sweden rer 2.06 3.80 4.09 3.99 3.77 3.57 3.34
North Euro Area ny 1.99 2.98 3.44 3.77 4.02 4.22 4.36
China ny 0.77 2.90 4.05 4.42 4.31 3.97 3.66
Canada ex 4.17 3.35 3.23 3.28 3.42 3.54 3.66
Total Sum 257.1 297.6 300.5 301.3 300.3 298.2 296.2
China Real Imports (%)
China im 95.58 89.70 84.62 80.77 77.93 75.81 74.15
China ex 22.69 30.38 36.77 41.68 45.14 47.57 49.29
China ny 5.23 6.27 7.15 8.10 9.22 10.07 10.91
Turkey k 7.74 6.17 5.61 5.33 5.12 5.01 4.94
Norway ny 5.28 5.48 5.41 5.29 5.16 5.05 4.96
Switzerland k 5.31 5.19 4.68 4.22 3.86 3.59 3.40
South Africa im 3.59 4.17 4.42 4.48 4.48 4.44 4.36
Brazil ex 3.44 3.81 4.09 4.23 4.31 4.32 4.32
South Africa ex 3.64 3.76 3.85 3.87 3.76 3.69 3.60
Canada ex 4.03 3.95 3.71 3.50 3.31 3.17 3.08
Korea ny 4.04 3.69 3.35 3.12 2.94 2.79 2.68
Switzerland ex 5.27 4.07 3.36 2.89 2.54 2.29 2.13
Total Sum 255.2 253.5 253.3 253.7 254.3 254.8 254.7
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Figure 2: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive one s.d. shock to North Euro Area
Domestic Demand∗
(a) response of Euro-area variables
(b) Eﬀects on real domestic demand after 4 quarters
∗Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.
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Figure 3: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive one s.d. shock to North Euro area
Real Imports∗
(a) response of Euro-area variables
(b) Eﬀects on real exports after 4 quarters
∗Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.
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Figure 4: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive one s.d. shock to South Euro Area
Real Imports∗
(a) response of Euro-area variables
(b) Eﬀects on real exports after 4 quarters
∗Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.
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Figure 5: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Negative one s.d. shock to South Euro
Area Real Exchange Rate∗
(a) Eﬀects on real eﬀective exchange rates after 4 quarters
(b) response of Euro-area domestic variables
∗Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.
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Figure 6: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive one s.d. shock to US real domestic
output∗
(a) response of U.S. variables
(b) Eﬀects on non-export real output after 4 quarters (c) Eﬀects on real exports after 4 quarters
∗Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.
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Figure 7: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Negative one s.d. shock to US real exchange
rate∗
(a) response of U.S variables
(b) Eﬀects on real exports after 4 quarters
∗Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.
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Figure 8: : Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive one s.d. shock to the real oil
price∗
(a) Real oil price
(b) Eﬀects on non-export real output after 4 quarters
(c) Eﬀects on real exports after 2 quarters
(d) Eﬀects on real eﬀective exchange rate after 2 quarters
∗Bootstrap mean estimates with 90% bootstrap error bounds.
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Table A.1: Data Sources
Country Real GDP Real GCF Real exports Real imports REER
Australia OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Austria OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Belgium OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Brazil W DI(3)∗ W DI(3)∗ W DI(3)∗ W DI(3)∗ IFS(4)
Canada OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
China W DI(3)∗ W DI(3)∗ W DI(3)∗ IFS(4)
Finland OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
France OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Germany OECD(2) W DI(3)∗/ OECD(1) OECD(2) OECD(2) IFS(4)
Greece OECD(2) W DI(3)∗/ OECD(1) OECD(2) OECD(2) IFS(4)
India W DI(3)∗ W DI(3)∗ W DI(3)∗ W DI(3)∗ OECD
Indonesia W DI(3)∗ W DI(3)∗ OECD(2)/ W DI(3)∗ OECD(2)/ W DI(3)∗ OECD
Ireland OECD(2) OECD(1)/ W DI(3)∗ OECD(2) OECD(2) IFS(4)
Italy OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Japan OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Korea OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD
Mexico OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Netherlands OECD(1)) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
New Zealand OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Norway OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Portugal OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
South Africa OECD(2) OECD(1)∗ OECD(2) OECD(2) IFS(4)
Spain OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Sweden OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Switzerland OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Turkey OECD(2) OECD(1)∗ OECD(2) OECD(2) OECD
UK OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
USA OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) OECD(1) IFS(4)
Notes: (1) Economic Outlook No 101. (2) Quarterly National Accounts. (3)World Development
Indicators. (4) IMF, International Financial Statistics. (∗)Interpolated from annual data. REER
indicates real eﬀective exchange rate.
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Table A.2: Unit Root Tests
Country
ny k ex im reer
Level D D2 Level D D2 Level D D2 Level D D2 Level D D2
Australia -2.62 -6.64 -13.23 -3.12 -7.48 -9.55 -1.72 -9.40 -10.55 -3.42 -6.26 -8.37 -2.12 -7.90 -10.02
Brazil -1.35 -2.29 -8.97 -1.28 -3.81 -10.18 -0.97 -5.87 -7.21 -0.67 -3.38 -9.73 -3.10 -5.23 -10.14
Canada -1.55 -5.60 -8.80 -3.11 -7.28 -10.21 -1.08 -4.29 -9.22 -1.23 -6.74 -9.18 -2.13 -6.75 -10.02
China -2.33 -3.08 -7.80 -0.28 -4.71 -8.30 -1.34 -5.93 -7.45 -0.25 -6.55 -8.72
France -1.06 -4.26 -14.04 -3.11 -5.09 -15.07 -1.42 -6.60 -8.49 -2.01 -6.07 -7.71 -2.76 -6.47 -9.50
Indonesia -1.96 -7.72 -10.50 -1.64 -4.74 -9.42 -3.46 -9.48 -10.48 -3.17 -8.01 -8.50 -1.88 -8.21 -10.70
India 0.53 -4.63 -10.94 -0.57 -4.22 -11.57 0.05 -3.86 -9.91 -0.97 -4.34 -9.74 -0.86 -5.59 -10.04
Ireland -2.09 -2.34 -6.28 -1.23 -5.45 -8.52 -1.81 -6.81 -8.41 -1.52 -5.88 -8.74 -1.60 -4.99 -9.52
Japan -0.05 -4.55 -9.34 -1.14 -6.29 -8.63 -3.97 -7.15 -8.91 -2.25 -7.32 -14.43 -1.53 -5.45 -8.20
Korea -0.59 -4.86 -9.09 -1.31 -7.68 -11.28 -0.86 -6.12 -9.59 -1.87 -8.23 -10.34 -3.19 -6.50 -9.60
Mexico -3.78 -7.96 -9.29 -2.32 -7.10 -8.49 -1.94 -9.81 -10.24 -2.18 -5.72 -8.75 -4.12 -6.01 -15.00
NEA 0.54 -5.27 -8.90 -2.82 -4.90 -8.23 -2.81 -6.36 -7.86 -2.18 -6.16 -8.34 -2.61 -6.45 -8.70
Norway -1.83 -11.32 -11.11 -2.64 -8.56 -10.43 -0.56 -11.77 -11.33 -2.14 -7.70 -10.72 -2.21 -8.56 -11.07
New Zealand -1.86 -6.30 -9.36 -3.30 -9.11 -10.39 -0.85 -9.99 -10.27 -4.18 -7.28 -8.03 -2.51 -4.97 -9.77
South Africa -1.71 -9.85 -12.25 -1.23 -3.83 -8.94 -1.56 -7.38 -13.35 -2.81 -7.08 -10.67 -4.19 -6.32 -7.95
SEA -1.81 -2.59 -8.29 -1.33 -5.99 -9.58 -1.72 -6.19 -7.44 -1.39 -5.75 -8.76 -2.46 -6.27 -9.73
Sweden -1.85 -6.44 -10.04 -2.70 -5.72 -9.90 -2.08 -6.47 -11.02 -3.14 -6.43 -8.40 -3.62 -6.35 -9.79
Switzerland -3.19 -8.28 -10.69 -3.12 -8.43 -13.05 -4.75 -7.43 -9.48 -4.76 -8.33 -10.80 -2.76 -6.71 -9.21
Turkey -2.49 -8.14 -9.07 -1.99 -4.36 -9.77 -0.05 -5.04 -8.38 -3.98 -7.94 -8.65 -1.37 -8.52 -10.21
UK -1.75 -6.38 -10.18 -2.69 -5.88 -9.81 -1.82 -9.56 -10.24 -1.33 -6.46 -10.06 -3.19 -7.19 -9.53
USA -1.66 -4.31 -7.77 -2.08 -6.54 -9.09 -1.63 -6.14 -9.44 -1.67 -5.24 -8.27 -2.34 -5.53 -9.29
Notes: Unit root tests based on weighted-symmetric ADF test (WS). Lag Length chosen based on AIC. Values in bold indicate rejection
of the null hypothesis. D and D2 indicate ﬁrst and second diﬀerences of the levels respectively.
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Table A.3: Weak Exogeneity Test among NEA's and SEA's Variables
chosen lags p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1
South Euro Area Variables
nysouth k south exsouth imsouth reer south
North Euro Area Model 4.90∗ 0.97 1.00 1.94 0.03
North Euro Area Variables
nynorth knorth exnorth imnorth reernorth
South Euro Area Model 0.36 5.81∗ 0.02 1.92 0.13
chosen lags p∗ = 2, q∗ = 1
South Euro Area Variables
nysouth k south exsouth imsouth reer south
North Euro Area Model 1.12 4.35∗ 1.26 3.57 0.32
North Euro Area Variables
nynorth knorth exnorth imnorth reernorth
South Euro Area Model 0.02 7.29∗ 0.11 3.53 1.42
Notes: This table refers to weak exogeneity tests for the NEA's variables on SEA's
region-speciﬁc VECM model and vice-versa. Weak exogeneity test is based on the works
of Johansen (1992) and Harbo et al. (1998). See subsection 4.3 for more information. ∗
denotes rejection of the test's null hypothesis.
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Figure A.1: Regional Current Account Balances as percent of GDP
Source: OECD, World Bank and authors' calculations.
Figure A.2: Bootstrap Means of Persistence Proﬁles
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